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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 981421-CA

MICHAEL TODD McARTHUR,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for burglary and theft,
both second degree felonies, entered after defendant entered
guilty pleas pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App.
1988).

This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f)(1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that defendant's

friend, Aimee Rolfe, was acting as a citizen informant with
permissive access to the McArthur home when she entered and
removed certain items from it?
An appellate court "review[s] the factual findings
underlying the trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
to suppress evidence [under the Fourth Amendment] using a clearly

1

erroneous standard.

[It] reviewfs] the trial court's conclusions

of law based on these facts under a correctness standard."

State

v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 854-55 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted).
2.

Assuming arguendo that Rolfe was acting as a government

agent, as defendant alleges, would her seizure of items from the
home be fatal to the search warrant affidavit where, omitting all
reference to the seizure and including all information defendant
asserts was intentionally omitted, the affidavit nonetheless
demonstrates probable cause?
When information is added or excised from an affidavit
because of a prior illegality, the reviewing court must evaluate
the affidavit de novo to determine if it will still support a
finding of probable cause.

State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191

(Utah 1986).
3.

Where defendant neither argued to the trial court nor

mentioned in his Sery plea that his post-Miranda confession
should be suppressed, should he now be permitted to raise the
issue before this Court for the first time on appeal?
No standard of review applies where an issue has been
waived.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
2

things to be seized.
U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with one count each of burglary and
theft, both second degree felonies, for unlawfully entering and
removing property from a home in Salt Lake County (R. 3-5).
After defendant was bound over to district court, he filed a
motion to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a warrant he
claimed was unsupported by probable cause (R. 21, 24-26).

The

trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing (R.
38, 89-91).

Defendant then entered conditional guilty pleas to

both charges (R. 59-60).

The trial court sentenced defendant to

concurrent terms of one-to-fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison, which it suspended in favor of twelve months in the Salt
Lake County jail.

The court also imposed a fine and ordered

various conditions of probation (R. 97-100).

Defendant then

filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 101).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In early March of 1997, over $200,000 worth of property was
stolen from a home in Salt Lake County (R. 3-5). Deputy Sheriff
Vaun Delahunty, an officer with eighteen years of experience, was
assigned to lead the burglary investigation (R. 114: 3).
In early June, Delahunty was given the name of a patrol
deputy who had been in contact with an individual possessing

3

"information about one of the big burglaries [Delahunty was]
working on" (Id. at 27) . Delahunty contacted the deputy, who
told him that he had picked up a woman named Aimee Rolfe on a
forgery or credit card charge and that "she had information that
would —

that related to a large burglary that included a lot of

guns, and that she would be willing to talk . . . about it" (Id.
at 4-5, 27). Delahunty did not pursue the particulars of the
forgery or credit card matter, but rather focused his attention
on the burglary investigation by following up on the Aimee Rolfe
lead (LdL at 27). l
Delahunty initially tried to contact Rolfe at an address
provided by the deputy (Id. at 5). The current residents,
however, stated that Rolfe had moved and was now living with
defendant's mother on the east side (Id. at 5-6). They gave
Delahunty a current telephone number for Rolfe.

On June 16th,

following this lead, Delahunty located Rolfe at the McArthur home
(Id. at 7, 79). Delahunty testified, "She said that she didn't
really want to speak there.

She was a bit nervous.

She would

talk to me later" (Id. at 7).
Aimee Rolfe met Delahunty the next day at the sheriff's
patrol substation (Id. at 8). According to Delahunty, Rolfe
admitted to him that she had been passing forged checks (Id. at

1

Delahunty testified that he had no knowledge of whether
the forgery matter, which arose out of checks stolen in this
burglary, had ever been charged against Rolfe (R. 114: 38).
4

42).

Expressing no animosity towards defendant, she indicated

that "she knew that she had done wrong, that she was trying to
get her life back in order, and was willing to help" (Id. at 34;
accord id. at 39).
For his part, Delahunty acknowledged to Rolfe that "there
could be some heat rolling [her] way on [the forgery matter], but
[that he didn't] investigate the forgeries" (Id. at 38). In any
event, he did not know of any ongoing forgery investigation (Id.
at 25-26).

Accordingly, he made clear that "[a]ny help she

wanted to give me was strictly on her own" (Id. at 38). That is,
he never indicated that he could help her on any other case that
might arise, he never offered her money in exchange for
information, he never promised her anything (Id. at 24, 66).
Even at the time of the suppression hearing, Delahunty did not
know whether forgery or any other charges had been pursued
against Rolfe (Id. at 25-26, 38, 65-66).
At the police substation, Rolfe told Delahunty about her
general involvement with defendant and his friends.

In addition,

Delahunty testified, she described the burglary in detail,
"from the planning, beginning stages, how it happened, when,
where, what was taken . . . and how it was disposed of and who
had it" (Id^. at 8) .
Specifically, Rolfe said she was at Dominick Newman's house
on March 3, 1997, late at night.

5

Defendant and Newman announced

they were "going to work," a euphemism for committing a burglary
that drew laughter from those present (Id. at 11). Rolfe then
left the home to go to her job, returning early the next morning
to find defendant and Newman unloading property - including guns,
crystal, alcohol, vases, bags, and a computer - from defendant's
car (Id.).

Her detailed descriptions of the property she saw

them unloading closely matched the descriptions of many items
taken in the burglary (Id. at 12) .2

Rolfe also told the officer

about damage to an automatic gate-opening device, describing how
she had driven Newman to the burglarized home the day after the
break-in in order to retrieve a bag Newman had left behind (Id.
at 12-13).3
Rolfe volunteered to Delahunty that some of the stolen
property was at defendant's mother's house, where she was living
at the time (Id. at 15-16).

Specifically, "[s]he described a

Marine Corps combat fighting knife.

She described a Rolex watch,

a Dunhill brand solid gold cigarette lighter, . . . a crystal

2

For example, she described "a crystal cookie jar with a
very unique [sic] gold-plated duck head on it," "very unique
[sic] Chinese vases, porcelain vases," "handguns . . .
individually cased with tops and linings, some double sets
opposed to each other which she referred to as cowboy style
guns," and "clothing which was neatly pressed and folded" (R.
114: 12) .
3

On about June 19th, to corroborate Rolfe's story,
Delahunty asked Rolfe to direct him to the burglarized home (R.
114: 13-14, 17). She did so accurately and without any prompting
from him (Id. at 13-14).
6

ashtray and crystal cigarette lighter . . . and some . . .
porcelain dolls" (Id. at 16).
Sometime between mid-June and the first of July, Rolfe told
Delahunty that she could retrieve some of the stolen items from
the McArthur home, specifically mentioning the Marine Corps knife
and one of the crystal objects, which she said were located in
defendant's room (Id. at 16-17, 19). She offered to get the
items when she went by the house to pick up some personal
property, prior to moving to her mother's home.

Delahunty

responded to Rolfe's offer by saying that it would be great (Id.
at 19). To the best of Delahunty's knowledge, Rolfe was still
living in the home when she offered to retrieve the stolen
property (IdL. at 18) .4
On June 30th, because Rolfe did not have a car, Delahunty
met her in West Jordan and drove her to the McArthur home (Id. at
18, 45). 5 At Rolfe's direction, Delahunty, somewhat concerned,
pulled his vehicle into the driveway.

Rolfe reassured him,

stating, "[T]here's no problem" (Id. at 20). Carrying nothing

4

While Delahunty believed that Rolfe was living at the
McArthur residence, he also thought that "she was staying with a
friend in West Jordan" because "she was uncomfortable with some
of [defendant's] behavior" (R. 114: 18). Delahunty thought that
Rolfe's "overall plan" was to move to her mother's home (Id. at
19).
5

Rolfe told Delahunty that between mid-June and the end of
the month, she was out of state due to a death in her family (R.
114: 62, 68-69).
7

and clad only in shorts, a shirt, and sandals, Rolfe went to the
front door, found it was locked, and then walked around to the
side of the house, out of sight.

She returned to the parked

police car a few minutes later, carrying a large plastic storage
bin that contained various personal items, a crystal ashtray, and
the Marine Corps fighting knife (Id. at 20-21, 22, 47, 65). She
turned the ashtray and knife over to Delahunty.6

Delahunty then

dropped Rolfe off at a friend's house and prepared an affidavit
and a search warrant (Id. at 23, 47) .
On July 3rd, Delahunty returned to the McArthur residence
with the authorized search warrant and several detectives.

He

knocked on the front door, heard loud music, walked around to the
side of the house, knocked on a sliding glass door, opened it,
announced himself repeatedly, and eventually entered the home and
followed the music down to the basement, where he found defendant
and a friend in a bedroom (Id. at 30). Delahunty announced
himself again and stated that he had a search warrant.
did not resist.

Defendant

In the ensuing search, the detectives found many

items taken from the burglarized home (Id. at 31-32).

Defendant

waived his Miranda rights and admitted his involvement in the
burglary (Id. at 32-33).

Because the ashtray measured five-to-six inches in
diameter and the knife measured about a foot in length, Delahunty
opined that neither could have been secreted on Rolfe's person
prior to her entry into the home (R. 114: 21).
8

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendant's central premise is that his friend, Aimee Rolfe,
was acting as a government agent when she entered his home, took
two items of stolen property, and then turned them over to the
police.

If this Court determines that Rolfe was not acting as a

government agent, then the Fourth Amendment has no applicability,
and this Court can summarily affirm defendant's convictions.
At the trial court correctly determined, the evidence
demonstrates no governmental overreaching in this case.

While

the police plainly knew of and acquiesced in Rolfe's decision to
enter the McArthur home and retrieve certain items, this alone is
insufficient to render Rolfe a government agent.
must be analyzed as well.

Other factors

Rolfe's expressed motivation for

acting as a citizen informant appeared to be primarily personal.
In addition, while Rolfe faced criminal charges, the officer in
this case made clear from the outset that he had nothing to do
with any charges that might be filed against her.

He offered her

nothing, stating explicitly that any help she provided was
"strictly on her own."

Furthermore, he did not direct or guide

her activities in any way.

Because Rolfe was not acting as an

agent of the government, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to
this case.
Independent of the issue of government agency, neither the
Fourth Amendment or its exceptions apply to Aimee Rolfe's act of

9

entering the McArthur home because the record plainly establishes
that she enjoyed permissive access to the premises.

Thus, even

if this Court determines that Rolfe was acting as a government
agent, her permissive entry would not give rise to a Fourth
Amendment violation.
Only if this Court determines that Rolfe was a government
agent must the Court then examine the affidavit supporting the
search warrant.

The State contends that because Rolfe was in the

home with permission, both her entry and her seizure of stolen
items in open view were lawful.

Even assuming, however, that

Rolfe unlawfully removed the items, and that all references to
the removed items were excised from the affidavit, that document
would nonetheless support the probable cause determination.
Defendant also argues that the police officer intentionally
or recklessly omitted material information from the affidavit,
the inclusion of which would negate probable cause.

However,

defendant ignores the fact that the alleged omissions were
plainly against Rolfe's own interest.

Because she risked

increased criminal exposure by speaking out, the omitted material
would have bolstered, rather than undercut, Rolfe's reliability
as an informant.
Finally, defendant argues that his post-arrest confession
must also be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

This

issue was not preserved, either by raising it before the trial

10

court or by specific inclusion in the Sery plea.

Consequently,

it is waived on appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
BECAUSE AIMEE ROLFE WAS NOT ACTING
AS A GOVERNMENT AGENT, HER ENTRY
INTO THE MCARTHUR HOME AND REMOVAL
OF TWO ITEMS FROM IT DID NOT
IMPLICATE THE FOURTH AMENDMENT; IN
ANY EVENT, BECAUSE SHE ENJOYED
PERMISSIVE ACCESS TO THE HOME, HER
LAWFUL CONDUCT IS NOT SUBJECT TO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Defendant's brief turns on the premise that Aimee Rolfe was
acting as an agent of the government when she entered the
McArthur home and removed certain items without a either a
warrant or justification pursuant to a warrant requirement
exception.

See Br. of App. at 13-21.

Because the search warrant

affidavit arose from this alleged violation of the Fourth
Amendment, defendant asserts, the search pursuant to the warrant
must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.

See id. at

33-34.
a. Rolfe was not acting as a government agent when she
entered the McArthur home and removed two stolen items from
it.
Defendant's premise that Aimee Rolfe was acting as a
government agent when she entered the McArthur home and removed
two items from it forms the linchpin of this case. A
determination by this Court that Aimee Rolfe was not acting as a

11

government agent disposes of defendant's whole case, which is
based entirely on a Fourth Amendment violation arising out of
governmental misconduct.
The legal analysis begins with the fundamental principle
that the Fourth Amendment protects only against actions of the
government.

The Fourth Amendment does not provide any guarantees

against unreasonable searches or seizures conducted by private
citizens.

United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984);

Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921).

Thus, if a

private individual conducts a search or seizure, even wrongfully,
suppression of resulting evidence will not be a remedy, so long
as the government ultimately acquires the evidence lawfully.7
Walther v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656 (1980); State v.
Newbold, 581 P.2d 991, 992 (Utah 1972).
The seminal Utah case for analyzing whether an individual is
acting in a private capacity or as a government agent is State v.
Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1220 (Utah 1988).

At the outset, Watts

makes clear that defendant, as the party objecting to the
admission of the evidence, must carry the burden of establishing
that an agency relationship existed between Rolfe and Officer

7

This result comports with the deterrent purpose
underlying the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., State v. Thurman,
846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993(citations omitted). That is,
where there is no police misconduct to deter, evidence need not
be suppressed. Sims v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d 6, 19
(Utah 1992).
12

Delahunty.

Id. at 1221.

Because this case, like so many others,

falls "[i]n the "gray area' between the extremes of overt
governmental participation in a search and the complete absence
thereof[,]" it "must be judged according to the nature of the
governmental participation in the search process and in light of
all of the facts and circumstances of the case." Id.
The test for government agency involves two critical areas
of inquiry: first, whether the government knew of or acquiesed in
the intrusive conduct; and second, if the government was
involved, whether the individual's intent and purpose was to
further law enforcement or to advance the individual's own selfinterest.

IcL. at 1221-1222, 1223; State v. Kourv, 824 P.2d 474,

477 (Utah App. 1991).

Factors highlighted by this Court in

conducting the analysis include the nature of the relationship
between the actor and the police, whether the actor received
rewards or compensation for information, and whether the police
gave the actor direction or guidance for conducting himself.
Kourv, 824 P.2d at 477 (citing Watts, 750 P.2d at 1222-23).8

Defendant seeks to expand the Utah test by relying on an
Iowa case, State v. Cov, 397 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1986), rev'd on
other grounds, Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988), and by testing
the facts of this case against "the Coy factors". See, e.g., Br.
of App. at 20-22. While defendant asserts that the Iowa test is
"essentially the same as the test articulated in Watts," it is
not. The second Iowa factor, "whether the state, although
knowing the challenged conduct was occurring or likely to occur,
did nothing to prevent it," is not part of the Utah analysis.
Br. of App. at 17 (citations omitted). Utah caselaw nowhere
articulates a requirement of proactive State intervention in
13

In this case, it is undisputed that Officer Delahunty knew
of and acquiesced in Rolfe's decision to enter the McArthur home
and retrieve certain items.

When Rolfe offered to obtain the

items at the same time she retrieved some of her own property,
Delahunty responded by saying, "[TJhat would be great'' (R. 114:
19).

Delahunty also drove Rolfe to the McArthur home in his car

to get the property, waited in the driveway while she entered the
home, and accepted two items from her when she returned to the
car (Id. at 18, 23, 46, 47). These facts alone, however, are not
dispositive of the agency question.
The Utah Supreme Court has noted that "law enforcement
agencies out of necessity rely heavily on informants." Watts,
750 P.2d at 1221.

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has

emphasized that the Fourth Amendment should not "discourage
citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the
apprehension of criminals."
443, 488 (1971).

Coolidae v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.

Precisely because the police so often work with

informants, the mere fact that Officer Delahunty did so in this
case should be insufficient to establish an agency relationship.
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Bulgier, 618 F.2d 472 (7th Cir.), cert, denied,
449 U.S. 843 (1980); State v. Sanders, 395 S.E.2d 412 (N.C.
1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1051 (1991); Peters v. State, 393

order to prevent an agency relationship from arising.
14

S.E.2d 387 (S.C. 1990);
1981).

People v. Sellars, 417 N.E.2d 877 (111.

Rather, the inquiry must proceed to an analysis of the

intent and purpose underlying Rolfe's conduct and to the
subsidiary issues identified by this Court in Kourv.
In this case, Rolfe was not shy about revealing her
motivation for retrieving the items. As background, in talking
with Officer Delahunty, she described her relationship with
defendant as "friends," but said that defendant "probably thought
she was his girlfriend7' (Id. at 25) . Although she expressed
discomfort with some of defendant's behavior, she demonstrated no
animosity towards him (Id. at 18, 34). Indeed, she seemed
primarily concerned with "want[ing] to come clean and get her
life in order" (Id. at 39). Officer Delahunty testified: "[S]he
said that she knew she had done wrong, that she was trying to get
her life back in order, and was willing to help" (Id. at 34). 9
Rolfe, then, was acting for the most part on her own.10

See

Providing information to the police was, for her, the way
to make a final break with defendant after a lengthy relationship
and so to get a fresh start.
10

Certainly, it would be difficult to assert that Rolfe's
conduct was motivated either purely by self-interest or purely by
a desire to aid law enforcement. Any unarticulated desire to
have defendant apprehended, however, seems subsidiary to her
expressed self-interest and, in any event, would be insufficient
by itself to render her a government agent under Watts. "Where
the government has offered an informant no form of compensation
for his or her efforts, ^personal motives in fact are likely to
be mixed with the desire to help the authorities.'" Kourv, 824
P.2d at 478 n.2 (quoting United States v. Bazan, 807 F.2d 1200,
1204 (5th Cir. 1986), cert, denied 481 U.S. 1038 (1987)).
15

Watts, 750 P.2d at 1223.
Furthermore, Officer Delahunty did not direct or guide
Rolfe's conduct in any significant way.

While Delahunty

initially contacted Rolfe, he did so only after Rolfe herself had
volunteered information about the burglary to another police
officer (R. 114: 4, 3 9 ) . n Rolfe subsequently appeared of her
own volition at the police station to disclose what she knew
about the burglary and, later, voluntarily directed Delahunty to
the McArthur home (Id. at 8, 18-20).
Described by Officer Delahunty as "brash, forthright, [and]
outspoken," Rolfe was very much in control of how events
unfolded.

Initially, she chose to describe several of the

unique, stolen items in detail (Id. at 12). She subsequently
told Delahunty precisely which items she could and could not
obtain and why (Id. at 19, 24-25, 67). Of Rolfe's leadership
role in retrieving the items from the McArthur home, Delahunty
testified:
I was kind of nervous about the situation.
Aimee directed me to pull right in the
driveway. I questioned whether she wanted me
to do that, and she said, "Yes, there's no
problem." I pulled into the driveway. She
said, "Wait here." She left my vehicle and
walked into the house.
(Id. at 20). Rolfe returned five or ten minutes later with a

11

Rolfe told another officer about the burglary after she
had been picked up on forgery charges. Delahunty received the
information third hand (R. 114: 4-5, 26-27).
16

large Tupperware storage bin containing some of her personal
property and two of the stolen items (Id. at 21). Rolfe informed
Delahunty that defendant and his niece were at home and that
defendant had lit a cigarette for her with a stolen lighter while
she was inside (Id. at 22, 66-67).

She then turned the two

stolen items over to Delahunty (Id. at 23, 47).
Nor did Officer Delahunty make any offers of reward or
otherwise entice Rolfe to cooperate.

Indeed, while Rolfe had

been picked up on related forgery charges, Delahunty clarified to
her at the outset that he had nothing to do with those charges
and could offer her no help should charges be filed against her.
He testified, "I told Aimee, I think my exact words were, *Aimee,
you know fully well there could be some heat rolling your way on
this, but I don't investigate the forgeries, I don't even know
where the forgeries occurred'" (Id. at 38). His testimony
continued, "Any help she wanted to give me was strictly on her
own" (Id.).

Delahunty also explicitly stated that he offered her

no compensation in exchange for her help (Id. at 24). Prior to
this incident, Delahunty had never used Aimee Rolfe as an
informant.

Indeed, he had never even met her (Id. at 71).

Because Rolfe's motivation was primarily personal and
because Officer Delahunty neither directed her conduct nor
offered her anything in exchange for her help, it is fair to
conclude that Rolfe's actions were not "substantially motivated

17

by the prompting and encouragement of the [police]."
P.2d at 1223.

Watts, 750

The trial court entered findings and conclusions

.to this effect, which the record supports.12

Under such

circumstances, defendant has failed to carry his burden of
establishing an agency relationship between Rolfe and the police.
Because Aimee Rolfe was not acting as a government agent
when she entered the home and removed the items, the Fourth
Amendment has no applicability to this case.

Consequently, since

a Fourth Amendment violation constitutes the essential basis of
this appeal, defendant's argument fails and his convictions
should be affirmed.
b.

Rolfe enjoyed permissive access to the McArthur home.

Independent of the issue of government agency, neither the
Fourth Amendment nor its exceptions apply to Aimee Rolfe's act of
entering the McArthur home because the record plainly establishes
that she enjoyed permissive access to the premises.
Consequently, even if this Court determines that Rolfe was acting
as a government agent, her entry and lawful taking of items from
the home would not give rise to a Fourth Amendment violation.
This Court's legal reasoning in State v. Koury, 824 P.2d 474
(Utah App. 1991) controls.

In Koury, the Court determined that

12

The trial court both "found" and "concluded" that Rolfe
"was a citizen informant." R. 90-91 or addendum A. Properly,
the determination is a conclusion of law, supported by the record
facts cited in this brief.
18

an individual acted lawfully when, with permissive access to
defendant's home, he took cocaine residue from the home and
turned it over to the police.

He had not engaged in "intrusive

conduct" because he "had permission to be in defendant's home and
was there at defendant's request."

Kourv, 824 P.2d at 478. The

court stated: "It is not illegal for a private individual, even
if acting as a government agent, to enter another's home if he or
she does so with the owner's permission."

Id. (citing United

States v. Bennett, 709 F.2d 803, 806 (1983) aff'd, 729 F.2d 923
(2d Cir.) cert, denied 469 U.S. 1075 (1984).

Similarly, here,

where Rolfe had permissive access to the home, her entry did not
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The trial court found that Rolfe "had habitually come and
gone from the McArthur residence" and "had permission to be in
the McArthur residence on June 30, 1997".13
addendum A.

See R. 90 at

The record evidence supports these findings.

First, defendant's mother testified that she owned the home.
She had never given Rolfe explicit permission to move in, but
over time Rolfe gradually had moved in, residing in the home with
defendant for some time prior to his arrest (R. 114: 78-79).

13

The

Defendant argues at length that the trial court's
determination that Rolfe was living at the home on June 30th was
clearly erroneous. See Br. of App. at 27-30. The critical
question, however, is not whether Rolfe was actually residing in
the home, but whether she had permissive access to it. Thus, the
court's determination about her residence, regardless of its
accuracy, is not dispositive.
19

mother testified, ''Well, did I say, xAimee, you can move in' ?
No, I didn't.

But she stayed overnight, and kind of just

continued to stay overnight there" (Id. at 81). Eventually, the
mother testified, "I thought they probably split up . . . [and
Rolfe] moved out of the house" (Id. at 81-82) . Nonetheless,
"[Rolfe] still came back once in a while. . . . She's kind of
been like that for years" (Id. at 82). According to defendant's
mother, Rolfe had been in the home off and on "[f]or about ten
years" (Id.).

She also testified that Rolfe, like some of

defendant's other friends, could have come into the home without
her explicit invitation but with defendant's permission, since he
was also living there (Id. at 84).14
Second, based exclusively on what Rolfe told him, Officer
Delahunty testified about his understanding of Rolfe's
relationship to the McArthur household (Id. at 51) .15

In mid-

June, Rolfe indicated to Delahunty that she had access to the
McArthur home: "She told me she was living there" (Id. at 19).16

14

Defendant did not testify.

15

Notwithstanding Delahunty's knowledge that Rolfe may
have committed a crime of dishonesty by forging checks, he found
that the information she conveyed "was extremely detailed, and it
keyed and dovetailed into everything I knew and understood about
the burglary" (Id. at 70). Consequently, based on his first-hand
experience with Rolfe, Delahunty determined that she was credible
(Id. at 52) .
16

She also told Delahunty that she was staying in West
Jordan with a friend at the time (Id. at 18).
20

He explained:
She said she had some of her personal
property that she needed to pick up pending
her move to her mother's home. She had some
of her property she needed to get. . . . I
can't recall her exact conversation as to
whether she was moving out. Her overall plan
was to move back with her mother at some
point in time, and her personal property and
belongings were at the McArthur residence.
(IcL)
Two weeks later, Rolfe still had access to the home.

Based

on conversations with her, Delahunty believed "that she lived
there, that she was staying there, living there on and off" (Id.
at 52).17

Delahunty's first-hand experience with Rolfe in going

to the McArthur home on June 30th confirmed what Rolfe had told
him about having access to the home.

Rolfe's openness in

directing Delahunty to pull right into the driveway, her easy
access into the home, and her breezy announcement that defendant
had lit her cigarette with a stolen lighter while she was inside,
all confirmed Delahunty's belief that Rolfe had permission to be
in the home.

Indeed, Delahunty testified that he had absolutely

no reason to believe that Rolfe had anything but free access to
the house (Id. at 23, 66).
The trial court found that Rolfe had access to the McArthur

17

Rolfe apparently did not enjoy a single, stable,
permanent residence anywhere. Rather, she seems to have lived in
various places at various times, including the McArthur home, an
apartment in West Jordan, her mother's home, and a trailer in
West Jordan (R. 114: 76).
21

home.

The record evidence supports those findings, and defendant

has failed to demonstrate clear error in the findings.18
Consequently, this Court should conclude that, because Rolfe
enjoyed permissive entry to the home, her entry was lawful,
regardless of whether or not she was functioning as a government
agent at the time.
POINT TWO
EVEN IF THIS COURT DETERMINED THAT
ROLFE WAS ACTING AS A GOVERNMENT
AGENT, THAT DETERMINATION WOULD NOT
BE FATAL TO THE VALIDITY OF THE
AFFIDAVIT: WITH ALL REFERENCES TO
AN ALLEGEDLY IMPROPER SEIZURE
EXCISED AND ALL ALLEGEDLY OMITTED
INFORMATION INCLUDED, THE AFFIDAVIT
STILL SUPPORTS PROBABLE CAUSE TO
SEARCH
Defendant argues that because the affidavit supporting the
search warrant was based largely on a government agent's initial
unlawful search and seizure, the evidence seized later by police
when they entered the home pursuant to the warrant must be
suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree.
33-34.

See Br. of App. at

The Court need only reach this argument if it determines

that Rolfe was acting as a government agent.19

18

Based on its findings, the trial court concluded that
Rolfe "had a right to enter the McArthur home" (R. 91 at addendum
A) .
19

If she was not acting as a government agent, then her
acts of giving information and property to the police implicate
neither the Fourth Amendment nor its remedy of suppression. See
Watts, 750 P.2d at 1220. Under such circumstances, defendant's
22

a. Even omitting all references to the seizure of the
ashtray and knife, the affidavit still supports the probable
cause determination.
Assuming arguendo that Rolfe was a government agent, her
entry was nonetheless lawful because, as has been explained, she
enjoyed permissive access to the McArthur home.20

Her subsequent

acts of seizing the Marine Corps fighting knife and the crystal
ashtray were also lawful.

No allegation has been made that she

removed the objects from an area of the home that was restricted
to her.

To the contrary, she told Officer Delahunty that the

crystal ashtray and knife were located in the bedroom, which she
shared with defendant (R. 114: 16, 80). Both because the items
were in open view and because defendant could not claim any
possessory interest in stolen property, Rolfe's act of removing
them along with her own personal property did not offend the
Fourth Amendment.

See Koury, 824 P.2d at 476.

Even assuming arguendo, however, that Rolfe unlawfully
removed the items, such a reading of the facts would not be fatal
to the State's case.

If Rolfe unlawfully removed property from

the home and the police included information about that removal
in the affidavit, then that information would be excised and the

remedy for Rolfe's entry into the home without permission would
lie in an action for trespass. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-206.
20

Even defendant concedes that "McArthur allowed [Rolfe]
inside as a guest." Br. of App. at 42. See also supra Point
I.b.
23

remaining portions of the affidavit evaluated for probable cause.
See State v. Viah. 871 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah App. 1994) (after
.stale information excised, affidavit still remained viable).
course, only the references to Rolfe's seizure
taken from the home should be excised.

Of

of the two items

Her observations

of what

she saw inside the home would rightfully be included in the
affidavit because she had permission to be there.

That is,

observations of items in open view in an area where a person has
a right to be are properly included in an affidavit.

See State

v. Belaard, 840 P.2d 819, 823 n.4 (Utah App. 1992).21
In this case, even if Rolfe's seizure of the two items is
omitted from the search warrant affidavit, the remaining
information would nonetheless demonstrate that "the issuing
magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that there were
enough facts within the affidavit to find that probable cause
existed."

State v. Collard, 810 P.2d 884, 885 (Utah App. 1989).

In relevant part, the affidavit, with all reference to
Rolfe's removal of the fighting knife and ashtray deleted, would

21

Thus, the single scenario under which defendant could
prevail in his quest for suppression is if this Court determines
both that Rolfe was acting as a government agent and that she
entered the home without permission. In that case, everything
Rolfe observed inside the home on June 30th would have to be
excised from the affidavit. Because the remaining information,
dating back several months, would likely be considered stale, it
would provide an inadequate basis for finding probable cause.
See, e.g., Viah, 871 P.2d at 1033 (stale information cannot be
sole basis for determining probable cause exists).
24

read:
Ms. Aimee Rolfe told your affiant that during
the first part of March 1997, she was with
Michael Todd McArthur and Dominic Newman when
they said that they were "going to work." The
next morning when Aimee went back to Mr.
Newman's residence, she observed the two men
unloading numerous items of personal property
from Dominic's vehicle into his residence.
The next day Dominic Newman took Aimee to the
house where they had obtained the property,
which is Mr. Clark's residence. . . . On June
30, 1997, Aimee went to Mr. McArthur's
residence located at 2802 East 3900 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah. . . . Aimee has seen a
. . . crystal ashtray[22] on . . . [an] . . .
entertainment shelf and two Lladro figurines
in the home on 30 June 1997. Aimee observed
the defendant in possession of a solid gold
Dunhill brand cigarette lighter. On 30 June
1997, she used it to light up a cigarette.
Mr. Clark has reported missing from his home
Lladro figurines, a Waterford crystal ashtray
and a Dunhill sold gold cigarette lighter.
State's exhibit #1 or addendum B.
The information contained in this affidavit forms an
adequate basis for a "reasonable common sense belief" that stolen
property would be found in the McArthur home.
Strombera, 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah App. 1989).

State v.
The affidavit

communicated that Rolfe was with defendant when he and Newman
announced they were "going to work."

22

This euphemism, appearing

The reference to the ashtray is mistaken. It should
read "crystal lighter," since Rolfe had taken the crystal ashtray
from the home prior to the preparation of the affidavit. What
remained in the home was the crystal lighter that matched the
ashtray. See R. 114: 58-59 (discussing the transposition). The
search warrant reflects the same error.
25

in quotation marks as a cue to an unusual or special connotation,
is not explained.

The meaning of the phrase, however, emerges

from the context of other facts cited in the affidavit.

That is,

the affidavit reflected that Rolfe observed defendant and Newman
unloading property from a vehicle the next morning and that
Newman later took Rolfe to the Clark home, from which the
property had been taken.

Plainly, in context, "going to work"

referred to the burglary of the Clark home.23
The affidavit also reflects that Rolfe had personally
observed a crystal ashtray,24 two Lladro figurines, and a gold
Dunhill cigarette lighter in the McArthur home.

The homeowner

had described three such items as stolen from his home.
Certainly, a common-sense interpretation of this information
would lead a magistrate to believe there was a fair probability
that the property Rolfe saw in the McArthur home was the same
stolen property the homeowner had described, that it had come
from the "work" done by defendant and Newman, and that it would
be found in the McArthur residence.

Consequently, even omitting

the information relating to Rolfe's removal of the knife and the
ashtray from the home, the affidavit is nonetheless sufficient to
demonstrate probable cause.

23

Delahunty testified that he orally explained the meaning
of "going to work" to the magistrate when he presented the
affidavit and warrant for authorization (R. 114: 57).
24

See footnote 24.
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b. With all purportedly omitted information included, the
affidavit still supports the probable cause determination.
Defendant also argues that the affidavit supporting the
search warrant was fatally flawed due to material omissions by
Officer Delahunty.

Had the omitted information been included, he

asserts, the veracity and reliability of Rolfe's statements would
have been so undercut as to defeat the probable cause
determination.

See Br. of App. at 37-43.

Specifically,

defendant argues that the affidavit should have revealed that
Rolfe had been picked up for forging checks stolen in the
burglary; that she was a possible suspect in the burglary and
faced potential charges of forgery and receiving stolen property;
that her contact with Delahunty arose out of her forgeries; and
that Delahunty facilitated her retrieval of stolen items from the
McArthur home.

See Br. of App. at 37-38.

The law in Utah is well-settled that "a defendant must
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that material
information has been intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
omitted, and, [sic] that with the omitted information inserted,
the affidavit does not support probable cause."

State v. Lee,

863 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Neilsen, 727
P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986)).

However, when the additional facts,

if they had been known to the magistrate issuing the search
warrant, would still have resulted in a finding of probable
cause, evidence will not be suppressed.
27

Neilsen, 727 P.2d at

191.25
In this case, defendant's argument fails at the outset
because even had the purported omissions been included in the
affidavit, they would not have defeated probable cause.
trial court so determined:

xx

[t]here were no material omissions

made which would render the search warrant invalid."
addendum A.

The

R. 91 at

This determination is correct.

Defendant argues that Rolfe's involvement in a crime of
dishonesty would have fatally undermined her reliability as an
informant and that the nature of Delahunty's relationship with
her would inexorably have led to the conclusion that she was a
police informant.
Defendant, however, ignores the reality that by voluntarily
revealing the details of her personal knowledge and involvement
to Officer Delahunty, Rolfe increased her own criminal exposure.
When Rolfe directed Delahunty to the burglarized home and
provided a detailed itemization of stolen items she had seen, she
was in fact corroborating her criminal involvement to Officer
Delahunty.

Cf. State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah

1985) (finding the "verification of significant facts" from the

The Utah Supreme Court, adopting the reasoning
articulated in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), has
declared that "[d]eterrence of police misconduct is not to be a
factor in the decision to suppress unless the misconduct
materially affects the finding of probable cause." Neilsen, 727
P.2d at 191.
28

informant's statement bolsters credibility).

Given that

Delahunty had clarified to Rolfe at the outset that any
information she provided was "strictly on her own" and that he
had made no promises of any kind to her, Rolfe had nothing to
gain by admitting knowledge of the burglary and thus
demonstrating her personal involvement in the crime.26
Consequently, her statements against her own interest would have
bolstered her credibility rather than undercut it.

See State v.

Sanders, 496 P.2d 270, 273 (Utah 1972)(admission of defendant's
statement bolsters credibility because "experience teaches that
it is unlikely he would so declare unless it were true'') .
As to defendant's assertion that Rolfe was a police
informant, the record evidence simply fails to support this
conclusion.

See supra Point l.a.

Because Rolfe was not a

government agent, information relevant to that determination is
immaterial to the affidavit.
Furthermore, defendant has failed to persuasively
demonstrate that Officer Delahunty's purported omissions were
either reckless or intentional.

In his testimony, Delahunty

unequivocally stated that he had no contact whatsoever with Rolfe
concerning the forgery or credit card matter on which she was

Rolfe articulated what she believed to be her intangible
personal interest in revealing what she knew. That is, she told
Delahunty that "she wanted to come clean and get her life in
order" (R. 114: 39).
29

originally picked up by the police (R. 114: 5, 27). Even at the
time of the suppression hearing, he had no idea if those charges
.had ever been pursued (Id. at 38). Because he had promised Rolfe
nothing and because he had no contact with her other than as an
informant in this burglary, he saw no reason to disclose what he
deemed to be information irrelevant to the affidavit.
Because the purportedly omitted information would more
likely have bolstered the probable cause determination than
defeated it, defendant's assertion that the officer intentionally
omitted material information from the affidavit must fail.
POINT THREE
ANY ISSUE RELATED TO DEFENDANT'S
CONFESSION IS WAIVED BY HIS FAILURE
TO PRESERVE IT BEFORE THE TRIAL
COURT OR IN HIS SERY PLEA; EVEN ON
THE MERITS, HIS POST-ARREST
STATEMENTS NEED ONLY BE CONSIDERED
SHOULD THIS COURT FIRST FIND THAT
ROLFE WAS A GOVERNMENT AGENT WHO
ENTERED THE HOME WITHOUT
PERMISSION, OR THAT THE AFFIDAVIT
WAS SO DEFECTIVE AS TO INVALIDATE
THE SEARCH WARRANT
Finally, defendant argues that his post-arrest, post-Miranda
confession must be suppressed because it was not attenuated from
either Rolfe's misconduct as a government agent or Officer
Delahunty's misconduct in omitting material information from the
affidavit.

See Br. of App. at 43-46.

Because defendant never

raised this issue below, the trial court was not accorded an
opportunity to rule upon it.

Consequently, barring plain error
30

or exceptional circumstances, neither of which have been asserted
here, it is waived on appeal.
1311 (1987).

State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309,

Additionally, defendant failed to preserve the

matter in his Sery plea.

His plea specifically states that,

pursuant to Sery, defendant preserves only "the issue of the
legality of the search warrant for appeal" (R. 51). See also R.
115: 1-2, 5.

Consequently, the issue is twice waived.

Even on the merits, this issue could only be reached if this
Court first determines either that Rolfe was acting as a
government agent who entered the McArthur home without permission
or that the search warrant affidavit was so defective as to
invalidate the probable cause determination.
In the first instance, if Rolfe was a government agent who
intruded into the McArthur home, then both her entry into the
home and her seizure of property would violate the Fourth
Amendment.

Consequently, the warrant would constitute the fruit

of the poisonous tree and the search warrant that depended on it
would be invalid.
In the second instance, if the affidavit was rendered
invalid by the information Officer Delahunty did not include in
it, then the search warrant would also be invalid.
observations

Rolfe's

of what she saw inside the home would rightfully be

included in the affidavit because she had permission to be there.
That is, observations of items in open view in an area where a

31

person has a right to be are properly included in an affidavit.
See State v. Belaard, 840 P.2d 819, 823 n.4 (Utah App. 1992).27
The State asserts neither of these arguments has merit.

See

supra Points I and II.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
second degree felony convictions for theft and burglary.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 5 ^ d a y of May, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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Thus, the single scenario under which defendant could
prevail in his quest for suppression is if this Court determines
both that Rolfe was acting as a government agent and that she
entered the home without permission.
32

ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

FILED DISTRICT COURT
REBECCA C. HYDE, #6409
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

Third Judicial District

MAR 2 7 1998
MT/-AKE COUNTY
Ttopury CI or K

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS
OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

:

v.

:

MICHAEL TODD MCARTHUR,
Defendant.

:

Case No. 971901299FS
JUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON

:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This matter came before the Honorable F. Wilkinson on December 22,1997
on Defendant's Motion to Suppress the Evidence. The plaintiff, the State of Utah was
represented by Richard G. Hamp, and the defendant, Michael Todd McArthur was
represented by Rebecca C. Hyde. Testimony was received by this Court and arguments
presented by counsel.

Based upon the foregoing, this Court makes the following

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

0 000S 0

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Aimee Rolfe had permission to be in the Mcarthur residence on June

2.

Aimee Rolfe had habitually come and gone from the McArthur

3-

Aimee Rolfe was living at the McArthur residence on June 30,1997.

4.

The Defendant, Michael McArthur expected and was aware that Ms.

30, 1997.

residence.

Rolfe freely came and went to and from the residence.
5.

Aimee Rolfe had a right to enter and leave the McArthur house on

June 30, 1997.
6.

Aimee Rolfe was a citizen informant.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Though additional information could have been included, the search

warrant was supported by probable cause.
2.

There were no material omissions made which would render the

search warrant invalid.
3.

Aimee Rolfe was a citizen informant who had a right to enter the

McArthur home.
DATED this J~f

day of February, 1998.
BY THE COURT:

/OUDGE HOMER F. WILKINSON
'Third District Court, Division I

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to the office of the District
Attorney, 231 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this
1998.

day of February,

ADDENDUM B

E. NEAL GUNNARSON
DISTRICT ATTORNEY
RODWICKE YBARRA, Bar No. 4184
DEPUTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY
231 E. 400 SOUTH
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 3637900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:

Michael L. Hutchings

450 South 200 East

MAGISTRATE

ADDRESS

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
County of Salt Lake )
The undersigned affiant, Vaun Delahunty, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That your affiant has reason to believe
That

on the person of Michael Todd McArthur
and/or
on the premises known as 2802 East 3900 South

In the City of Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there is now certain property or
evidence described as:
1.
2.
3.

Waterford Crystal Ashtray
Various Lladro porcelain statues
Gold Dunhill cigarette lighter

PAGE 2
A
>FFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

and that said property or evidence:
was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a party to
the illegal conduct, or
consists of an item of, or constitutes evidence of, illegal conduct, possessed by a person
or entity not a party to the illegal conduct.
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is evidence of the crime or crimes of
Burglary, Theft and Theft by Receiving Stolen Property.

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are:
Your affiant is a Detective with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office currently assigned
to the Burglary Investigations Unit. Your affiant has been a Deputy Sheriff for 18 years and has
spent the last two years working specifically with burglary and theft investigations.
Ms. Dorothy Gant, the housekeeper for Mr. Michael Clark, who resides at 2550 East
Brentwood Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, has told your affiant that on 3 March 1997 she checked
on Mr. Clark's residence while he was out of town and found everything to be in order. On 4
March 1997, she returned and found the house to be ransacked and numerous items of Mr.
Clark's personal property, including numerous guns, computers, electronics, ait objects, clothing,
tools, alcohol, crystal, figurines, silverware, a Ford Bronco automobile and other items missing.
Ms. Aimee Rolfe told your affiant that during the first part of March 1997, she was with
Michael Todd McArthur and Dominic Newman when they said that they were "going to work."
The next morning when Aimee went back to Mr. Newman's residence, she observed the two men
unloading numerous items of personal property from Dominic's vehicle into his residence. The
next day Dominic Newman took Aimee to the house where they had obtained the property,
which is Mr. Clark's residence. On 30 June 1997, Aimee went to Mr. McArthur's residence
located at 2802 East 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. There she obtained a Kbar Marine
Fighting Knife in a distinctive leather sheath from Michael Todd McArthur's bedroom and a
Waterford Crystal cigarette lighter from the an entertainment center shelf in the front room of the
residence and gave them to your affiant. Mr. Clark has identified these items as being among
those stolen in the above-described burglary. Aimee has seen a matching crystal ashtray on the
above-mentioned entertainment shelf and two Lladro figurines in the home on 30 June 1997.
Aimee observed the defendant in possession of a solid gold Dunhill brand cigarette lighter. On
30 June 1997, she used it to light up a cigarette. Mr. Clark has reported missing from his home
Lladro figurines, a Waterford crystal ashtray and a Dunhill solid gold cigarette lighter.
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WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items:
in the daytime.

Vaun Delahunty
AFFIANT
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

/

day of July, 1997
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